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A stylized fact is that agents respond more acutely to negative than positive stimuli. Such findings
have generated insights on mechanism-design, have been featured prominently in policymaking, and
more generally have led to discussions of whether preferences are defined over consumption levels
or changes in consumption. This study reconsiders this stylized fact. In doing so, it provides insights
into an important domain wherein positive stimuli induce a greater response than negative stimuli:
a principal-agent game with reputational considerations and with the agent on the market's short end.
This common setting represents an important feature of labor markets with involuntary unemployment.
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The principle of retaliation is as old as mankind. As far back as the Hammarabian code some 3000 years 
ago, retaliation of some form has served to organize behavior in both market and non-market situations. 
Perhaps illustrating the importance of revenge most succinctly is the Biblical injunction of Exodus 21:23-
25: “Life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth… bruise for bruise.” For their part, scholars have explored 
the importance of negative actions alongside their seemingly more benign cousins, positive actions. 
One of the key insights that can be taken from the decades of research within the social sciences is that 
reciprocity in general is important, and that negative actions toward an individual induce a greater 
behavioral response than comparable positive actions.
2 This stylized fact is perhaps best illustrated in 
the words of Baumeister et al. (2001), who provide a broad survey of several areas of study examining 
positive  and  negative  reciprocity,  and  conclude  that  (p.  354-55,  italics  added):  “The  breadth  and 
convergence  of  evidence,  however,  across  different  areas  were  striking,  which  forms  the  most 
important evidence. In no area were we able to find a consistent reversal, such that one could draw a 
firm conclusion that good is stronger than bad. This failure to find any substantial contrary patterns 
occurred despite our own wishes and efforts…Hence, we must conclude that bad is stronger than good at 
a pervasive, general level.”  
Within economics, such results have served as the classic example of loss aversion – that people are 
more  sensitive  to  negative  realizations  than  to  positive  realizations  of  uncertainty  (Tversky  and 
Kahneman (1991)) – have played an important role in policymaking (see List (2003)), and have informed 
mechanism  design.  In  terms  of  the  latter,  the  principal  is  confronted  with  an  interesting  decision 
problem if framing of the incentive scheme matters to agent behavior or the number of instruments 
available  to  the  principal  is  constrained.  In  this  manner,  choosing  between  carrots  and  sticks,  for 
example, plays an important role in the outcome (see Andreoni et al. (2003)). More generally, scholars 
have frequently remarked that this feature of human preferences represents one of the most robust 
general behavioral patterns in the social sciences (see the citations in Baumeister et al. (2001)). 
In this study, we explore a general setting wherein economic theory provides predictions that positive 
reciprocity should be stronger than negative reciprocity. The two key features are that the agent is on 
the short end of a market that includes reputational considerations and that being out of the market 
provides  less  utility  than  being  a  participant.  Under  this  design,  a  worker  that  respects  her  initial 
affective reaction and punishes the employer will find herself unemployed. Alternatively, a worker who 
                                                           
2 A particularly simple exposition involves no more than asking subjects to list emotions within a time limit (Van 
Goozen and Frijda (1993)). The number of negative emotions listed almost always exceeds positive ones. Along 
similar lines, Oehman et al. (2001) found that people identified threatening faces more quickly and accurately than 
happy faces. Such negative visual stimuli also induce larger amplitude brain responses than positive ones (Ito et al. 
(1998)). Generally, the negative domain commands affect and cognition more than the positive. In their survey, 
Baumeister et al. (2001) somewhat playfully draw our attention to Fiedler’s (1982) finding that nobody has ever 
written a successful novel about a happy marriage; there is something about negative events that seizes our 
attention. Similar to scholars in other social sciences, economists have found that negative events also call forth 
greater responses than their positive counterparts (see, e.g., Offerman (2002), Pereira et al. (2006) and Al-Ubaydli 
and Lee (2009)). 3 
 
is nice to the employer will be more likely to be employed in the next period. Since being employed 
dominates unemployment, we predict that the worker will restrain herself and will not follow the initial 
affective reaction. On the other hand, if the employer is nice, the worker will reciprocate strongly since 
in this situation not only is she employed, but also by a nice employer. In other words, we predict that in 
our setup positive reciprocity will be stronger than negative reciprocity.  
To test our theory, we design a simple controlled laboratory experiment, which yields several insights. 
First, consonant with the literature, agents reciprocate. And, when the interactions are anonymous, 
negative reciprocity is slightly more important than positive reciprocity, but not significantly so. Also 
consonant with the literature is the fact that agents become emotionally charged when treated poorly. 
Yet, this emotional charge does not readily transfer to actions when realistic institutional features are in 
place. For example, when agents can form reputations, they respond much more acutely to positive 
than to negative stimuli, serving to reverse the previously documented findings on the relative strengths 
of  negative  and  positive  reciprocity.  Second,  the  data  suggest  that  the  source  of  the  behavioral 
differences observed is strategic, rather than a change in the social norm of reciprocation in a gift 
exchange setting. Finally, the results also raise a methodological contribution of some import. Although 
the literature has implicitly drawn a parallel between the strength of reciprocal behaviors and other 
phenomena such as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, our analysis highlights a critical distinction: 
unlike in quantum mechanics, people responding more acutely to negative than positive stimuli is not a 
guaranteed  behavioral  phenomenon.  Rather,  its  presence  and  magnitude  depend  heavily  on 
institutional features that can only be understood with appropriate theoretical and empirical modeling. 
The remainder of our study proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains the experimental design. Section 3 
summarizes the experimental results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Experimental design 
To provide insights into measuring the strength of positive and negative reciprocity, we designed a 
simple two treatment experiment to test three conjectures. First, in one-shot environments, negative 
reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity. Second, in a repeated environment with a threat of 
exclusion, positive reciprocity is stronger than negative reciprocity. Finally, any observed difference in 
behavior across the two environments is not driven by affective reactions. In other words, when we 
condition on affective reactions, behavioral differences should remain. 
The game played by subjects is a discrete version of the trust game (Berg et al. (1995)) where the agent 
(worker) has the opportunity to punish as well as reward. It is also repeated with an opportunity for 
principals (managers) to choose among the workers in each period. We begin by describing the simple 
stage game.  
1. Stage game 
There are two players: a manager and a worker
vector of Figure 1, the top (bottom) 
actions:     ,         and       
manager’s choice and has three available ac
(2002),  the  payoff  consequences of  actions  are  separable  across  the  choices  of  each  player.
manager plays        , then both players’ payoffs are unchanged.
loses 10 points and the worker gains 15 points.
and the worker loses 15 points. Note that 
payoff. 
In each column vector, top number is manager payoff, bottom number is worker payoff. 
payoffs are obtained by summing the each of the two vectors implied by the strategy. 
reward,   denotes neutral and 
At all nodes, if the worker plays        
      , she loses 5 points and the manager gains 20 points. If the worker plays 
points and the manager loses 20 points. Thus 
have symmetric effects on the manager’s payoff
trust game, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium 
                                                           
3 In the experiment, roles and strategies were given neutral names. See below for more details. 
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There are two players: a manager and a worker who play the stage game in Figure 
(bottom) number is the manager’s (worker’s) payoff. The manager has three 
      . After the manager makes her choice, the worker 
available actions:       ,         and       .
3 Similar to Offerman
he  payoff  consequences of  actions  are  separable  across  the  choices  of  each  player.
both players’ payoffs are unchanged. If the manager plays 
loses 10 points and the worker gains 15 points. If the manager plays       , then she gains 15 points 
Note that      and        have symmetric effects on the worker’s 
Figure 1: Stage game 
op number is manager payoff, bottom number is worker payoff. 
payoffs are obtained by summing the each of the two vectors implied by the strategy. 
denotes neutral and   denotes punishment. 
       , both players’ payoffs are unchanged. If the worker plays 
, she loses 5 points and the manager gains 20 points. If the worker plays      
points and the manager loses 20 points. Thus        and        are equally costly to the worker and 
have symmetric effects on the manager’s payoff (as in Offerman (2002)). Similar to most 
trust game, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (assuming selfish preferences) is for the worker to
In the experiment, roles and strategies were given neutral names. See below for more details. 
 1. In each column 
payoff. The manager has three 
After the manager makes her choice, the worker observes the 
Similar to Offerman 
he  payoff  consequences of  actions  are  separable  across  the  choices  of  each  player.  If the 
If the manager plays     , then she 
she gains 15 points 
have symmetric effects on the worker’s 
 
op number is manager payoff, bottom number is worker payoff. Final 
payoffs are obtained by summing the each of the two vectors implied by the strategy.   denotes 
, both players’ payoffs are unchanged. If the worker plays 
      , she loses 5 
are equally costly to the worker and 
Similar to most versions of the 
is for the worker to 
In the experiment, roles and strategies were given neutral names. See below for more details.  5 
 
play         at all nodes and the manager to therefore play       . The unique symmetric efficient 
outcome is      ,               . 
2. Experimental game and treatments 
The full game has 8 players: 3 managers and 5 workers. It is repeated for an uncertain number of 
periods. Throughout all versions of the game, the 3 managers have fixed IDs. In the key “reputation” 
treatment,  workers  also  have  fixed  IDs,  which  are  carried  from  period  to  period.  In  the  one-shot, 
baseline treatment, the same fixed selection of IDs is randomly reassigned to each of the workers every 
round. For example, worker 3 might be a different person in round 1 to worker 3 in round 2. These 
features are common knowledge. 
Play proceeds in the following manner. 
1.  Nature decides the order in which each manager gets to select the worker that will be her 
partner (uniform distribution). 
2.  The first manager selects her partner; the next manager selects from the remaining workers, 
and so on. 
·  The 2 workers who are unselected for the round lose 25 points. This is 10 points less 
than the worst guaranteed payoff when selected. In other words, being employed by a 
nasty manager is better than being unemployed. 
3.  Each manager chooses between     ,         and       . 
4.  Each worker finds out which manager selected them and what choice the manager made. The 
workers who were not selected are informed of these choices. 
5.  Each paired worker chooses between       ,         and       . 
6.  All players see their own payoffs for the round. They also see the choices made by all manager-
worker pairs in that round and they see the history of choices by all pairs. 
·  Recall  that  worker  IDs  are  only  fixed  in  the  reputation  treatment.  In  the  one-shot 
treatment, it is common knowledge that, say, worker 5’s choice in round 3 may not have 
been made by the same player as worker 5’s choice in round 4. 
The game is repeated for a total of 11 rounds, though at the start of the experiment to prevent end-
game  effects  subjects  are  told  only  that  the  experiment  will  continue  for  a  “number  of  rounds.” 
Moreover, the decision-making stages of all sessions end at least 25 minutes in advance of the 90 
minutes for which subjects sign up (it takes about 10 minutes to calculate earnings and pay subjects). 
The reputation treatment is designed to capture a situation where reputational concerns – allied with an 
exclusion threat – will make positive reciprocity dominate negative reciprocity. The one-shot treatment 
is designed as a control where the elimination of reputational concerns and strategic exclusion will move 
the balance back towards the stylized fact, i.e., dominance of negative reciprocity. 
To explore affective reactions, in some sessions we asked each paired worker to declare privately how 
they feel about their manager’s choice: very unhappy, somewhat unhappy, neutral, somewhat happy, 6 
 
very happy.
4 This permits an exploration of whether affective reactions have a greater influence on 
reward/punishment decisions in the one-shot treatment. Since worker behavior was not different across 
the sessions where this information was elicited, we pool the data below. 
3. Procedure 
In total, we ran 9 sessions at George Mason University during spring 2009. Subjects were recruited from 
a database of students who had declared an interest in participating in economics experiments. Each 
session had 11 periods and 16 subjects divided into two groups of 8 (3 managers, 5 workers). Roles were 
assigned randomly and all interactions were anonymous. Subjects’ roles were fixed and they interacted 
exclusively with members of their own group. The total number of worker observations collected is 
therefore 591.
5 
The experiment was computer-based and used z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)).
 Instructions were on-screen, 
though a hard copy was given to each subject. All subjects were in the same room and within earshot 
and eyeshot of each other. This is potentially important because the monitor read the instructions aloud 
to  ensure  common  knowledge.  The  game  was  presented  in  a  neutral  frame,  i.e.,  managers  chose 
between     ,        and      , and workers chose between     20,         and          20. 
Managers were called      and workers were called      . After completing the experiment, subjects 
were paid privately.
6 
3. Empirical results 
Table 1 presents a summary of the experimental results. In this summary, to provide a first glimpse of 
behavioral patterns we have ignored data dependencies and pooled individual play over all 11 periods of 
the game. As we discuss each result below, we supplement these raw data patterns with conditional 
analysis. We begin with a first result. 
Result 1: In both treatments, workers reciprocate manager choices: they frequently reward      and 
punish       . 
Evidence to support this result can be seen in Table 1, where it is shown that workers reward      
actions in 51% of the cases in the one-shot treatments and in 84% of the cases in the reputation 
                                                           
4 The only part of the game that was not common knowledge was asking about emotions; it was not read out at 
the start (see procedure below) and only appeared on the workers’ screens. This was done to minimize priming of 
the subjects to think in terms of affective reactions. As noted, for robustness we also ran sessions where we did 
not ask the workers to declare their emotions. None of the results were affected. 
5 The treatment breakdown was 396 from one-shot and 195 from reputation. We lost the data from the last period 
of one group in one session (3 observations). 
6 To compensate for the fact that some subjects had a negative payoff, there was a large show-up fee, though this 
was only announced after the start of the experiment, i.e., subject recruitment utilized the usual GMU show-up 
fee. Average earnings were approximately $18.  
treatment. Likewise, they punish       
treatment and in 34% of the instances they occur in the reputation treatments.
significantly higher than the propensities to react 
the percentage of reward play in response to a manager choosing 
different from zero using conventional parametric statistical tests at the p < 
found when using nonparametric test
two samples are derived from identical populations.
Table 1: Summary statistics by 
Emotions are scaled as follows: 
somewhat happy, +2 = very happy.
                                                           
7 All of our inference (for all the results) excludes the data corresponding to managers selecting 
not relevant to comparisons of positive and negative reciprocity. 
of the excluded data. Mangers play        
        are insignificantly different from 0 (on a scale of 
7 
       actions in 53% of the instances they occur in the one
treatment and in 34% of the instances they occur in the reputation treatments.
7 These 
significantly higher than the propensities to react positively or negatively to other manager
in response to a manager choosing        ), and are all significantly 
different from zero using conventional parametric statistical tests at the p < 1% level. Similar results are 
metric tests that have a null hypothesis of no treatment effect, or that the 
two samples are derived from identical populations. 
Table 1: Summary statistics by treatment 
Emotions are scaled as follows: -2 = very unhappy, -1 = somewhat unhappy, 0 = neutra
somewhat happy, +2 = very happy. 
All of our inference (for all the results) excludes the data corresponding to managers selecting 
not relevant to comparisons of positive and negative reciprocity. For the interested reader, here are a few features 
        8% of the time. In both treatments, worker emotions in response to 
are insignificantly different from 0 (on a scale of -2 to +2) using a t-test (p > 30%). 
actions in 53% of the instances they occur in the one-shot 
These figures are both 
to other manager actions (i.e., 
), and are all significantly 
level. Similar results are 
a null hypothesis of no treatment effect, or that the 
 
1 = somewhat unhappy, 0 = neutral, +1 = 
All of our inference (for all the results) excludes the data corresponding to managers selecting         since it is 
For the interested reader, here are a few features 
8% of the time. In both treatments, worker emotions in response to 8 
 
These unconditional tests treat observations as IID. As a robustness check, we estimate conditional 
parametric  models  that  include  period  and  group  fixed-effects  as  well  as  individual  clusters.
8  The 
conditional results echo the unconditional results. For parsimony, we relegate them to the appendix. 
This result is not surprising, as scores of studies have found reciprocal behavior – from student subjects 
to CEOs (see, e.g., Offerman (2002), Andreoni et al. (2003), Fehr and List (2004)). Examining the data at a 
slightly deeper level, we observe another result that is in line with the literature. 
Result 2: In the one-shot treatment, negative reciprocity is slightly stronger than positive reciprocity, 
though the difference is statistically insignificant. 
Evidence to support this result can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. In Table 1, for example, we find that in the 
one-shot treatment, workers reward      actions in 51% of cases, while they punish        at the 
slightly higher rate of 53% of cases, though this difference is insignificant using Mann-Whitney and t-
tests. 
In Table 2, we demonstrate this result using conditional tests with individual clusters. Let the outcome 
variable be a dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if a worker reciprocates, i.e., responds to      with 
       or responds to        with       . We denote this variable            . Let the control 
group  be  the  observations  where  the  manager  plays          and  let  the  treatment  group  be  the 
observations where the manager plays      (both in the one-shot sessions). 
The estimated coefficient on ‘positive reciprocity’ should be read as how much more likely a worker is to 
reward      than she is to punish       . Using both a linear probability model (model 1) and a probit 
model (model 2), punishing        is 9% more likely than rewarding     , though this difference is 
again insignificant (p = 31%). This is directionally consistent with the existing literature’s finding that in 
one-shot environments, the negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity (Offerman (2002), 
Al-Ubaydli and Lee (2009)).
9 Our next result departs from the existing literature. 
Result 3: In the reputation treatment, positive reciprocity is stronger than negative reciprocity. 
Evidence to support this result can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. Looking at Table 1, we see that in the 
reputation treatment, unconditionally, a worker is 50% more likely to reward      than she is to punish 
      . Both Mann-Whitney and t-tests are significant at conventional levels (p < 1%). 
The conditional results with individual clusters are contained in Table 2. Again, the estimated coefficient 
on ‘positive reciprocity’ should be interpreted as how much more likely a worker is to reward      than 
she is to punish       . Using both a linear probability model (model 3) and a probit model (model 4), 
we find that the estimated coefficient is over 50% and statistically significant (p < 1%). 
                                                           
8 In all our parametric models, we use two clusters per worker: one for the worker’s decision at the      node and 
one at the        node. Using a common cluster instead affects none of our results (in fact using a common 
cluster shrinks the standard errors – as one would expect – though not by enough to alter any result). 
9 Essentially all our results are robust to using only data from periods 6-to-11, reinforcing the design’s attempts at 
avoiding any ‘end-of-session’ effects. The only slight exception is result 4. See below.  
The dummy variable ‘Reciprocate’ takes the value 1 when the worker reciprocates 
scaled as follows: -2 = very unhappy, -1 = somewhat unhappy, 0 = neutral, +1 = somewhat happy, +2 = very happy.
‘Reselect’ takes the value 1 when a worker is reselected by (any) manager in that period given selection in the previous peri
reciprocity’ is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 when the manager plays 
session’ is a dummy that takes the value 1 in reputation sessions. In probits, the reported figure is the estimated marginal 
contain clusters at the individual level. Group effects correspond 
observations corresponding to the manager playing 
significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%). 
9 
Table 2: Conditional results 
e’ takes the value 1 when the worker reciprocates      with        or        with 
1 = somewhat unhappy, 0 = neutral, +1 = somewhat happy, +2 = very happy.
‘Reselect’ takes the value 1 when a worker is reselected by (any) manager in that period given selection in the previous peri
reciprocity’ is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 when the manager plays        and 1 when the manager plays 
session’ is a dummy that takes the value 1 in reputation sessions. In probits, the reported figure is the estimated marginal 
contain clusters at the individual level. Group effects correspond to the fact that each session has two groups. All models exclude the 49 
observations corresponding to the manager playing        . Estimated period/group fixed effects are omitted. Asterices denote statistical 
 
with       . Emotions are 
1 = somewhat unhappy, 0 = neutral, +1 = somewhat happy, +2 = very happy. The dummy variable 
‘Reselect’ takes the value 1 when a worker is reselected by (any) manager in that period given selection in the previous period. ‘Positive 
when the manager plays     . ‘Reputation 
session’ is a dummy that takes the value 1 in reputation sessions. In probits, the reported figure is the estimated marginal effect. All models 
to the fact that each session has two groups. All models exclude the 49 
. Estimated period/group fixed effects are omitted. Asterices denote statistical 10 
 
This result stands in stark contrast to results in the literature, and questions the generality of bad being 
stronger than good. And, it provides the empirical reversal that has alluded researchers who have been 
unable to locate such an example (Baumeister et al. (2001)). Results 4-to-6 attempt to shed light on the 
underpinnings for this reversal. 
Result 4: The difference in reciprocity between one-shot and reputation sessions is driven primarily by a 
large increase in positive reciprocity when going from one-shot to reputation sessions. 
Empirical evidence to support this result can be seen in Table 1, where positive reciprocity increases by 
34% when moving from the one-shot to the reputation treatment, whereas punishment falls by 19%. 
Testing this formally requires a conditional parametric specification. In models 5 and 6 in Table 2, we 
pool the data from our one-shot and reputation treatments and include a reputation by session dummy 
variable and an interaction term between positive reciprocity and the reputation by session dummy. 
The reputation by session dummy coefficient informs tells us how much more likely workers are to 
punish        in the reputation treatment than in the one-shot treatment. The point estimates, of 
roughly 20%, suggest that workers are substantially less likely to punish in the reputation treatment, 
though this is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus negative reciprocity is at most 
slightly smaller in the reputation treatment than in the one-shot treatment. 
Given this result, the large (greater than 46%) and significant (p < 1%) coefficient of the interaction of 
the  reputation  and  positive  reciprocity  is  primarily  the  result  of  a  substantial  increase  in  positive 
reciprocity when going from one-shot to reputation.
10 Our next result concerns the underpinnings of the 
reversal. 
Result  5:  The  difference  in  the  balance  of  positive  and  negative  reciprocity  across  one-shot  and 
reputation sessions is not the result of differences in the affective reactions to      and        across 
one-shot and reputation sessions. 
Evidence to support this result can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. Recall that the scale for worker’s declared 
emotion after seeing the manager’s choice is: -2 = very unhappy, -1 = somewhat unhappy, 0 = neutral, 
+1 = somewhat happy, +2 = very happy. 
In Table 1, the mean emotion in response to      is +1.7 in the one-shot treatment and +1.8 in the 
reputation treatment. This difference is insignificant using three unconditional tests (Mann-Whitney: p = 
19%, t-test: p = 30%; Kolmogorov-Smirnov: p = 96%). The mean emotion in response to        is -1.6 in 
the one-shot treatment and -1.4 in the reputation treatment. This difference is marginally significant or 
insignificant depending on the unconditional test employed (Mann-Whitney: p = 10%, t-test: p = 12%; 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov: p = 66%). 
In model 7 in Table 2, we estimate a regression model of emotions (with individual clusters) on three 
explanatory  variables:  ‘positive  reciprocity,’  which  takes  the  value 0 when the manager  has  played 
                                                           
10 When we only use data from periods 6-to-11, in addition to the large increase in reward (73%), there is a large 
(but still smaller) decrease in punishment (52%). This does not affect the paper’s main argument. 11 
 
       and 1 when the manager has played     ; a reputation session dummy; and an interaction 
between  these  two  variables.  In  this  model,  the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  reputation  sessions 
dummy  and  on  the  interaction  between  positive  reciprocity  and  reputation  sessions  dummies  are 
statistically insignificant. In other words: worker emotive responses to manager choices do not depend 
upon being in one-shot vs. reputation treatments. Thus, the marginal significance levels obtained in a 
couple of the unconditional tests are the result of erroneously treating the observations as IID.
11 
Perhaps  the  most  compelling  evidence  that  the  results  are  not  driven  by  differences  in  affective 
reactions is that in the one-shot sessions, when the worker was very unhappy at the manager playing 
      ,  she  rewarded  the  manager  3%  of  the  time.  The  corresponding  Figure  for  the  reputation 
sessions was 17% (n = 103, p < 5% using a t-test and a MW-test). Clearly several workers were willing to 
reciprocate due to the threat of strategic exclusion in the reputation sessions. 
This suggests that the difference in the balance of positive and negative reciprocity across one-shot and 
reputation sessions is not the result of differences in the affective reactions, leading to our next result. 
Result  6:  The  difference  in  the  balance  of  positive  and  negative  reciprocity  across  one-shot  and 
reputation sessions is the result of strategic differences in the environment, specifically the threat of 
systematic exclusion. 
Evidence to support this result can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. The dimensionality of the history space is 
too large for sophisticated structural modeling (the data demands are not met either), however result 6 
can  still  be  derived  from  a  more  modest  structural  approach.  The  basic  hypothesis  is  that  in  the 
reputation sessions, managers seek workers who have rewarded      or who did not punish       . 
In Table 1, for example, we see that in the reputation treatment, if a worker rewards a play of     , 
then this increases her chances of being reselected by a manager in the subsequent round by 43% 
compared to not rewarding (significant at p < 3% using Mann-Whitney and t-tests). Similarly, if a worker 
punishes a play if       , then this decreases her chances of being reselected by a manger in the 
subsequent round by 24% compared to not punishing (significant at p < 3% using Mann-Whitney and t-
tests). In the one-shot treatments, statistically speaking, reselection chances are unaffected by past play. 
This is comforting since the worker IDs were scrambled every round and so the managers could not 
perform any systematic exclusion. 
Table 2 reveals that conditional models with individual clusters yield consistent results. Models 8 and 9 
confirm that rewarding      increases a worker’s probability of being selected in the next round by over 
35%. On the negative reciprocity side, models 10 and 11 confirm that punishing        diminishes a 
worker’s probability of being reselected by over 24%. Again, re-estimating models 8-11 using data from 
the one-shot sessions (omitted for parsimony), we find that all coefficients are statistically insignificant 
(all have a p-value greater than 50%) and have very small magnitudes (smaller than 5%). 
                                                           
11 A minor result that we omit for parsimony is that in both treatments, emotions predict reward and punishment 
in the expected way, i.e., subjects who report more positive emotions are more likely to reward and less likely to 
punish. 12 
 
While it is clear that managers account for worker actions in their partnerships choices, another manner 
in which managers’ behavior potentially changes is due to treatment itself. Our data reveal that workers 
punish much less often but reward more frequently in the repeated game than in the one shot game. An 
interesting query is whether managers use this information effectively in their choices. 
Given  the  unconditional  relative  frequencies  of  reward  and  punishment  behavior  in  the  one-shot 
treatment,  and  treating  workers  choices  as  IID  draws,  then  for  managers  we  have  that         
              , where   denotes strict preference under expected-payoff maximization. This is loosely 
reflected in their choices (see Table 1):        (54%),      (36%),         (9%). The comparatively 
large incidence of      is consonant with equity considerations. 
In  the  reputation  treatment,  both  the  optimal  and  realized  rank-ordering  of  manager  choices  is 
unchanged. While there is a slight increase (7%) in      at the expense of         and       , none of 
the changes are statistically significant using conditional or unconditional tests. To some extent, this is 
unsurprising  since  increased  reward  and  decreased  punishment  renders        and         
simultaneously more lucrative in absolute terms. This exploration leads to our final result. 
Result 7: Efficiency is substantially higher in the reputation treatment. 
The  total  realized  payoff in  the one-shot treatment  is 14% of the total  potential  payoff,  while  the 
corresponding Figure for the reputation treatment is 40%. The reason why both are so low is because 
any deviation from      and reward leads to a lower aggregate payoff, and such deviations are very 
frequent. Naturally, the efficiency improvement is driven by workers moving away from punishment 
towards reward. 
4. Conclusion 
As  Arrow  (1972,  p.  357)  put  forth  decades  ago  when  he  noted  that  “Virtually  every  commercial 
transaction  has  within  itself  an  element  of  trust,”  most  economic  and  non-economic  transactions 
require a degree of trust. With the element of trust comes the necessary ingredient reciprocity. Scholars 
as far back as Aristotle (2004) appreciated the importance of negative reciprocity, as he extolled that 
revenge serves to discourage mistreatment. More recently, scientists have come to the firm conclusion 
that  both  negative  and  positive  reciprocity  are  important,  but  that  at  a  general  level  the  relative 
strengths are not comparable: bad is stronger than good. 
This paper revisits this stylized fact by infusing two realistic features – the agent is on the short end of a 
market that includes reputational considerations and that being out of the market provides less utility 
than  being  a  participant  –  into  a  popular  laboratory  game.  We  argue  that  these  additional 
considerations  provide  a  setting  that  is  representative  of  many  common  economic  situations.  This 
alteration  permits  us  to  examine  the  relative  strengths  of  positive  and  negative  reciprocity  while 
simultaneously exploring the underpinnings for reciprocity. 13 
 
We find that the stylized fact in the literature is reversed in our setting: in repeated environments with a 
threat of systematic exclusion, good is stronger than bad.
12 This holds because in our setting being 
employed by an exploitative manager dominates unemployment. Rational agents understand that this is 
the case and act accordingly. Importantly, this reversal is not the consequence of a change in affective 
reactions. People are as happy about kind behavior in the repeated environment as they are in the one-
shot environment, and they are equally riled by unkind behavior across the two environments. Rather, 
the prominence of positive reciprocity in the repeated environment is driven by strategic concerns: 
those workers who are cooperative – either by reciprocating kind behavior or refraining from punishing 
unkind behavior – avoid unemployment by acting appropriately in the environment. 
We  view  these  results  as  important  in  several  domains.  First,  they  move  us  toward  a  deeper 
understanding of the relative strengths of positive and negative reciprocity. In this way, the received 
results highlight the importance of the economic and psychological features embedded in any economic 
environment. Second, in doing so they open new paths of inquiry. For instance, in public policymaking, 
the  general  discussion  of  whether  preferences  are  defined  over  consumption  levels  or  changes  in 
consumption has moved policymakers to more carefully consider the differences between willingness to 
pay and willingness to accept in cost benefit analysis. Understanding the mechanisms that underlie 
these valuation divergences is invaluable. Also, the practitioner interested in mechanism design might 
regard the results of import when crafting incentive schemes to alter agent behavior. 
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Conditional results for result 1 
The dummy variable ‘Reward’ takes the value 1 when the worker rewards. The dummy variable ‘Punish’ takes the value 1 when the
punishes. In probits, the reported figure is the estimated marginal effect. 
correspond to the fact that each session has two groups. Estimated period/group fixed effects are omitted. 
observations corresponding to the manager playing 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Conditional results for result 1 
The dummy variable ‘Reward’ takes the value 1 when the worker rewards. The dummy variable ‘Punish’ takes the value 1 when the
In probits, the reported figure is the estimated marginal effect. All models contain clusters at the individual l
correspond to the fact that each session has two groups. Estimated period/group fixed effects are omitted. All models exclude the 49 
observations corresponding to the manager playing        . Asterices denote statistical significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%).
 
The dummy variable ‘Reward’ takes the value 1 when the worker rewards. The dummy variable ‘Punish’ takes the value 1 when the worker 
All models contain clusters at the individual level. Group effects 
All models exclude the 49 
denote statistical significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%). 16 
 
Experimental instructions 
Welcome to our experiment in decision making. 
If you read these instructions carefully and make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of 
money. At the end of the experiment, your earnings will be paid to you, privately and in cash. 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly separated into groups of 8. You will only 
interact with your group members. Three of you will be randomly assigned the role of Red and five of you 
the role of Blue. So there are more Blues than Reds. [NEXT] 
At the beginning of the experiment, both Reds and Blues get 200 points each as a show-up fee. We will 
convert the points you earned into dollars at the rate of 10 points = $1. [NEXT] 
The experiment has a number of rounds. Each round has two stages. 
Stage 1: 
·  The Reds take turns to individually choose a Blue. The order in which the Reds get to choose a 
Blue is randomly determined. 
·  This results in 3 Red-Blue pairs with2 Blues left unmatched. 
·  The 2 Blues who have not been chosen in this round do nothing and their final earnings for the 
round are -25 points. [NEXT] 
·  Each Red chooses LEFT, MIDDLE or RIGHT. 
o  If a Red chooses LEFT: Red’s earnings are -10 points, Blue’s earnings are +15 points. 
o  If a Red chooses MIDDLE: Red’s earnings are 0 points, Blue’s earnings are 0 points. 
o  If a Red chooses RIGHT: Red’s earnings are +15 points, Blue’s earnings are -15 points. 
[NEXT] 
Stage 2: 
·  Each Blue learns if they are in a pair with a Red. 
·  If they are in a pair, they will learn the action their Red partner chose among LEFT, MIDDLE and 
RIGHT, and the corresponding earnings in points. 
·  The paired Blues will choose 1 of 3 actions: 
o  To add 20 points to their Red partner at the cost of 5 points to them. 
o  To subtract 20 points from their Red partner at the cost of 5 points to them. 
o  Do nothing at zero cost. [NEXT] 
·  Red’s final earnings will be changed by their Blue partner’s choice to add or subtract. If Blue 
chose to subtract, then Red’s earnings decrease by 20 points. If Blue chose to add, then Red’s 
earnings increase by 20 points. In both cases Blue’s earnings decrease by 5 points. 
·  If Blue does nothing, then Red’s and Blue’s final earnings are the points initially decided by the 
action chosen by the Red partner. 17 
 
·  Blues who have not been chosen in this round do nothing and their final earnings for the round 
are -25 points. [NEXT] 
That’s a round. The experiment will last a number of rounds. [NEXT] 
Reputation treatment 
IDs: 
·  Reds and Blues will have IDs (e.g., Red 2 or Blue 4). Both Reds and Blues always keep the same 
ID. 
·  After  every  round,  everyone  will  see  the  actions  chosen  by  the  3  Red-Blue  pairs  up  to  and 
including that round. People’s action choices are labeled by their ID. 
We will begin the experiment now. Your role in the experiment will be decided in the next screen. After 
your role is decided, I will read the specific instructions for Reds and Blues. Please refrain from asking any 
questions until I finish reading these instructions. [NEXT] 
Your ID for this round is Red ***. Your ID will be the same for all rounds. Specific instructions for Reds: 
·  The order in which you choose Blues as partners may change every round. 
·  If you are the first, you can pick any of the 5 Blues. 
·  If you are not the first, then you only pick from the Blues that were not chosen before. 
·  The 2 Blues that are not picked will earn -25 points for that round. 
·  Remember: both Reds’ and Blues’ IDs are always the same throughout the experiment. 
·  After choosing a Blue counterpart for the first stage, we ask that you choose LEFT, MIDDLE or 
RIGHT. The corresponding earnings are shown in the supplementary Figure. 
·  You will find out your Blue partner’s choice. [OK] 
Now the Blues. Your ID for this round is Blue ***. Your ID will be the same for all rounds. Specific 
instructions for Blues: 
·  If a Red picks you in a given round, you will find out which action your partner chose. The 
corresponding earnings are shown in the supplementary Figure. 
·  Then you will choose 1 action among 3 actions 
o  To add 20 points to your Red partner at the cost of 5 points. 
o  To subtract 20 points from your Red Partner at the cost of 5 points. 
o  Do nothing at zero cost. 
·  If a Red does not choose you, you will do nothing and your final earnings for this round are -25 
points. 




·  Reds and Blues will have IDs (e.g., Red 2 or Blue 4). Reds always keep the same ID. Blues get 
a random ID every round. (e.g. Blue 1 in round 1 may or may not be the same person as Blue 
1 in round 2.) 
·  After every round, everyone will see the actions chosen by the 3 Red-Blue pairs up to and 
including that round. People’s action choices are labeled by their ID. 
We will begin the experiment now. Your role in the experiment will be decided in the next screen. 
After your role is decided, I will read the specific instructions for Reds and Blues. Please refrain from 
asking any questions until I finish reading these instructions. [NEXT] 
Your ID for this round is Red ***. Your ID will be the same for all rounds. Specific instructions for 
Reds: 
·  The order in which you choose Blues as partners may change every round. 
·  If you are the first, you can pick any of the 5 Blues. 
·  If you are not the first, then you only pick from the Blues that were not chosen before. 
·  The 2 Blues that are not picked will earn -25 points for that round. 
·  Remember: Blues’ IDs may change every round. 
·  After choosing a Blue counterpart for the first stage, we ask that you choose LEFT, MIDDLE 
or RIGHT. The corresponding earnings are shown in the supplementary Figure. 
·  Remember: you keep the same ID throughout the experiment. 
·  You will find out your Blue partner’s choice. [OK] 
Now  the  Blues.  Your  ID  for  this  round  is  Blue  ***.  Your  ID  may  change  every  round.  Specific 
instructions for Blues: 
·  If a Red picks you in a given round, you will find out which action your partner chose. The 
corresponding earnings are shown in the supplementary Figure. 
·  Remember: your ID may change every round. 
·  Then you will choose 1 action among 3 actions 
o  To add 20 points to your Red partner at the cost of 5 points. 
o  To subtract 20 points from your Red Partner at the cost of 5 points. 
o  Do nothing at zero cost. 
·  If a Red does not choose you, you will do nothing and your final earnings for this round are -
25 points. 
·  Reds always keep the same ID. [OK] 
Check if there are any questions. If not, the game should start. If anyone asks about the number of 
rounds, the experimenter should simply repeat: 
“The experiment will last a number of rounds.” 
The experiment should go on for 11 rounds or 70 minutes – whatever comes first. That leaves 20 
minutes for paying people etc. 19 
 
Sample screenshot of a manager’s choice: 
 
Sample screenshot of a worker’s choice: 
 